Egyptians tend to describe any illogical or unverifiable statements or information as ‘newspaper talk’, an expression, which reflects the absence of credible Egyptian newspapers for many decades, considering the regime’s invariable control over their editorial policies. Although the press under Mubarak did not protect him from the January revolution, the control over newspapers remains a goal of the new regime, using means more or less identical to those used by Mubarak.

Egyptians tend to describe any illogical or unverifiable statements or information as ‘newspaper talk’, an expression, which reflects the absence of credible Egyptian newspapers for many decades, considering the regime’s invariable control over their editorial policies. Although the press under Mubarak did not protect him from the January revolution, the control over newspapers remains a goal of the new regime, using means more or less identical to those used by Mubarak.

Newspapers in Egypt have only three categories: the first are government sponsored newspapers, or the so-called national or state-owned newspapers. These newspapers are now under almost absolute control of the Muslim Brotherhood, but using new ways suiting a post-revolutionary Egypt, where a panel comprising press figures and MPs from the Shura Council select the new chief editors who are supporters, not necessarily members, of the Muslim Brotherhood, even if they have no ideological background since a journalist who belongs to no political movement will, as a matter of custom, follow those who select him/her for the post.

The second type is party-affiliated newspapers, which have been ineffective even before the fall of Mubarak. It is paradoxical that new parties, which attract street attention from both loyal and opposition groups do not have newspapers of their own. These include, for example, the Free Egyptians Party, the Egyptian Social Democratic Party, and the Constitution and Popular Movement Party. The Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafist parties are the only ones that have succeeded in launching newspapers whose impact on non-Islamic readers is still questionable.

The third type is the private newspapers, which are the most influential on public opinion. These include both printed and electronic newspapers,  whether known before the revolution as ‘Al Masry Al Youm’, ‘Shorouk’, and ‘Youm7‘,or after it, such as ‘Tahrir’, ‘El Watan’, and ‘Al Sabah’. The big question is: how will the regime along with its representatives deal with them under its wish to control the media, especially the printed newspapers, whose editors have antagonized religious movements for many years?

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The editorial team at Al-Masry Al-Youm

Will the Muslim Brotherhood control them, using means different than those under Mubarak’s times?

Propaganda Machines

Answering this question requires, first of all, a look at the near past of these newspapers. In a nutshell, it may be said that they suffered from the propaganda machine based on capital trends and the tendencies of their respective editors. For example, the previous chief editor of ‘Al Masry Al Youm’, Anwar Howari, was known for his religious views; however, he had to quit later in the aftermath of the crisis concerning publishing an advertisement for a wine company, which he did not approve. Ironically, Howari later worked as chief editor of Al-Wafd Party newspaper, before moving to the state-run ‘Al-Ahram Al-Iqtisadi’ newspaper, which he quit two months ago. Thus, he is the only editor who assumed the chief editor of private, party, and government newspapers in the last six years.

He was succeeded in ‘Al Masry Al Youm’ by Mr. Majdi Jallad who was barely known within press circles. After the revolution, he was entrusted with launching ‘El Watan’ newspaper, owned by a group of businessmen. He was always against the Brotherhood, before and after the revolution.

Oddly enough, the chief editor succeeding Jallad in ‘Al Masry Al Youm’ was Yasser Rizk, who came from state-owned ‘Al-Akhbar’ newspaper, and was affiliated with the military and a Muslim Brotherhood opponent. This makes it impossible for any analyst to monitor a stable editorial policy for the ‘Al Masry Al Youm’ under the management of these three chief editors.

”Al Masry Al Youm’ is the most prominent private Egyptian newspaper. Its proprietors say its circulation amounts to around a quarter of a million copies a day. On the other hand, ‘Shorouk’ newspaper is always associated with its publisher, Ibrahim El Moallem, a close ally of the former regime, especially Suzanne Thabet, wife of the ousted President Hosni Mubarak, who picked him out because of his publishing experience.

El-Moallem’s company issues another newspaper, ‘Tahrir’ whose chief editor Ibrahim Eissa has strongly turned against the Muslim Brotherhood since the revolution. The paper is very often accused of publishing exaggerated headlines against the Islamists, adopting deliberately biased attitudes towards the liberal movement and calling for a tolerant position vis-à-vis the former regime, if this is found to be critical of Islamists.

An observer of Eissa’s journalistic history will appreciate that his relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood was positive when he was chief editor of ‘Dostor’ newspaper. He didn’t even criticize ‘Al-Jama’a’ TV series when it was screened in September 2010. It was circulated within the press market that an unwritten agreement had been arranged with the Muslim Brotherhood to buy a large number of copies every day, in return for giving more coverage of their news.

Strangely enough, Eissa quit ‘Dostor’ in October 2010, following the newspaper’s purchase by the president of Al-Wafd Party, El-Sayyid el-Badawi, and businessman Ridha Edward, on alleged plans to develop it. Soon after their purchase, Eissa was removed. The newspaper has until now supported Mubarak’s regime and antagonized Muslim Brotherhood, amid leaks about attempts to buy it with the same scenario used by el-Badawi and Edward with its original owner, Essam Ismail Fahmy, two years ago.

Therefore, these newspapers will remain under the control of the financing parties and their relationship with the ruling regime. The same applies to ‘Al-Sabah’ newspaper, which is owned by businessman Ahmed Bahgat. This newspaper is considered the most up-to-date daily in Egypt, and Bahgat is viewed as an example of using money as a weapon for controlling the media. He long suffered from harassments to prevent press and media figures from appearing on ‘Dream’ TV network, most prominently Mohamed Hassanein Heikal. Consequently, the editorial policy of his newspaper may be evaluated according to the economic interests between him and the new regime.

Money is everything

Economic pressure will continue to be an effective weapon, according to columnist Abdullah Sinawi, who believes that the absence of principles of democracy means an easy control over the capital. This weapon was effective under Mubarak. After the revolution, some businessmen from Mubarak’s era are still influential in the media arena, like Mansour Amer who is known for his close links with CBC channels, despite the latter’s repeated denial.

Having been the chief editor of ‘Al-Arabi Al-Naseri’ newspaper’s, Sinawi believes that the analysis of what is published by newspapers every day reveals their red lines a few days later, which certainly applies to TV channels. He says that the private newspapers are suffering from a real dilemma because of their inability to announce a clear editorial policy amid a complete absence of the conscience requirement, which is supposed to govern journalistic work. But, changing the editorial heads of every newspaper means a complete change of its editorial policies; hence the dangers facing the Egyptian press in general, of whatever classification.

From the same perspective, Mu’nis Zuheiri, a columnist at the ‘Akhbar El Yom Foundation’, analyzes the problems that might affect private newspapers after taming the government newspapers and disintegrating the party-affiliated ones. Zuheiri believes that the Muslim Brotherhood does not need to directly control private newspapers because they have an effective weapon that can be used at any time; namely, the advertising agencies, with which newspapers conclude contracts for selling advertisement space to interested advertisers inside and outside the Egyptian market. The advertising agency has the right to interfere in the editorial policy, even through providing advice or opinion.

Zuheiri points out that establishing a dominating advertising agency is not difficult for a group that possesses huge consumer economic resources capable of providing quick capital even though the existing agencies know how to adapt to any new political system. But the official newspapers are still faced by considerable threats; their fall into the grip of the ‘privatization black bear’, as Zuheiri terms, will lead to total collapse of the Egyptian press, which needs continued competition to survive consistent political use by all the ruling regimes.

Zuheiri explains that the successive economic collapses inflicted on official newspapers make it easy to put them up for sale on pretext of rescuing them and reducing their heavy losses. This will allow businessmen – most likely close to the regime – to come to the surface, even if they conceal their political affiliations. By then, the Muslim Brotherhood will have gained control over everything, and then private newspapers will become just an easy task in the face of the ‘privatization black bear’.